Refinement checking plays an important role in system verification. This means that the correctness of the system is established by showing a refinement relation between two models; one for the implementation and one for the specification. In [22] , Wang et al. describe an algorithm based on antichains for efficiently deciding stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement. We identify several issues pertaining to the soundness and performance in these algorithms and propose new, correct, antichain-based algorithms. Using a number of experiments we show that our algorithms outperform the original ones in terms of running time and memory usage. Furthermore, we show that applying divergence-preserving branching bisimulation reduction results in additional run time improvements.
Introduction
Refinement is often an integral part of a mature engineering methodology for designing a (software) system in a stepwise manner. It allows one to start from a high-level specification that describes the permitted and desired behaviours of a system and arrive at a detailed implementation that behaves according to this specification. While in many settings, refinement is often used rather informally, it forms the mathematical cornerstone in the theoretical development of the process algebra CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes) by Hoare [9, 13, 14] .
This formal view on refinement-as a mathematical relation between a specification and its implementation-has been used successfully in industrial settings [6] , and it has been incorporated in commercial Formal Model-Driven Engineering tools such as Dezyne [17] . In such settings there are a variety of refinement relations, each with their own properties. In particular, each notion of refinement offers specific guarantees on the (types of) behavioural properties of the specification that carry over to correct implementations. For the theory of CSP, the-arguably-most prominent refinement relations are the stable failures refinement [2, 14] and failures-divergences refinement [14] . Both are implemented in the FDR [5] tool for specifying and analysing CSP processes.
Both stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement are computationally hard problems; deciding whether there is a refinement relation between an implementation and specification, both represented by CSP processes or labelled transition systems, is PSPACE-hard [10] . In practice, however, tools such as FDR are able to work with quite large state spaces. The basic algorithm for deciding a stable failures refinement or a failures-divergences refinement between implementation and specification relies on a normalisation of the specification. This normalisation is achieved by a subset construction that is used to obtain a deterministic transition system which represents the specification.
As observed in [22] and inspired by successes reported, e.g., in [1] , antichain techniques can be exploited to improve on the performance of refinement checking algorithms. Unfortunately, a closer inspection of the results and algorithms in [22] , reveals several issues. First, the definitions of stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement used in [22] do not match the definitions of [2, 14] , nor do they seem to match known relations from the literature [19] .
Second, as we demonstrate in Example 4.5 in this paper, the results [22, Theorems 2 and 3] claiming correctness of their algorithms for deciding both refinement relations are incorrect. We do note that their algorithm for checking stable failures refinement correctly decides the refinement relation defined by [2, 14] .
Third, unlike claimed by the authors, the algorithms of [22] violate the antichain property as we demonstrate in Example 4.6. Fourth, their algorithms suffer from severely degraded performance due to sub-optimal decisions made when designing the algorithms, leading to an overhead of a factor |Σ|, where Σ is the set of events, as we show in Example 4.5. This factor is even greater, viz. |Σ| |S | , where S is the set of states of the implementation, when using a FIFO (first in, first out) queue to realise a breadth-first search strategy instead of the stack used for the depth-first search. Note that there are compelling reasons for using a breadth-first strategy [13] ; e.g., the conciseness of counterexamples to refinement.
The contributions of this technical report are as follows. Apart from pointing out the issues in [22] , we propose new antichain-based algorithms for deciding stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement and we prove their correctness. We compare the performance of the stable failures refinement algorithm of [22] to ours. Due to the flaw in their algorithm for deciding failures-divergences refinement, a comparison of this refinement relation makes little sense. Our results indicate a small improvement in run time performance for practical models when using depth-first search, whereas our experiments using breadth-first search illustrate that decision problems intractable using the algorithm of [22] generally become quite easy using our algorithm. We also show that additional run time improvements can be obtained by applying divergence-preserving branching bisimulation reduction as a preprocessing step.
The rest of this technical report is organized as follows. In Section 2 the preliminaries of labelled transition systems and the refinement relations are defined. In Section 3 a general algorithm for checking refinement relations is described. In Section 4 this algorithm is extended with the antichain technique as shown in [22] . In Section 5 our corrected antichain algorithm is presented together with a proof of correctness. Finally, in Section 6 an experimental evaluation is conducted to show the effectiveness of these changes and the effectiveness of applying divergence-preserving branching bisimulation reduction.
Preliminaries
In this section the preliminaries of labelled transition systems, stable failures and failures-divergences refinement checking are presented.
Labelled transition systems
Let Σ be a finite set of events and let Σ τ be equal to Σ ∪ {τ }, where τ indicates the invisible event. A labelled transition system, abbreviated as LTS, is defined as follows. Definition 2.1. A labelled transition system is a tuple L = (S , init, Act, →) where S is a set of states; init ∈ S is an initial state; Act = Σ or Act = Σ τ is the set of events and → ⊆ S × Act × S is a labelled transition relation.
In the context of an LTS (S , init, Act, →) we use symbols s, t, u to denote states, U, V to denote sets of states and e to denote events. For states s, t ∈ S and an event e ∈ Act, a transition (s, e, t) ∈ → is also written as s e − → → t.
• s σe −→ → t if there is a state u ∈ S such that s σ − → → u and u e − → → t.
A sequence σ such that s σ − → → t is called a trace. The traces starting in s are defined by traces(s) = {ρ ∈ Act * | ∃t ∈ S : s ρ − → → t}. We define traces(L) to be traces(init).
The length of a sequence, denoted as |e 0 e 1 · · · e n−1 |, is equal to n. In particular, the length of the empty sequence, denoted as | |, is zero. For any sequence e 0 e 1 · · · e n−1 we say that any sequence e 0 e 1 · · · e k such that k < n − 1 is a prefix of e 0 e 1 · · · e n−1 . A weak trace is a trace where invisible events, denoted by τ , are ignored.
Definition 2.4. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. For all states s, t ∈ S , events e ∈ Σ and sequences ρ ∈ Σ * we define the weak transition relation s ρ t is the smallest relation satisfying:
• s s,
• s e t if s e − → → t, and
• s ρσ t if there is a state u ∈ S such that s ρ u and u σ t.
A sequence ρ such that s ρ t is called a weak trace. The weak traces starting in s are defined by weaktraces(s) = {ρ ∈ Σ * | ∃t ∈ S : s ρ t}. We define weaktraces(L) to be weaktraces(init).
Definition 2.5. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. For every state s ∈ S its reachable states are defined by reachable(s) = {t ∈ S | ∃σ ∈ Act * : s σ − → → t}. We define reachable(L) to be reachable(init).
For labelled transition systems we conclude with the definition of determinism.
Definition 2.6. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. We say that L is deterministic if and only if for all states s, t, t ∈ S if there are transitions s e − → → t and s e − → → t then t = t .
Refinement
The CSP process algebra builds on observations of failures and divergences. A failure is a set of events that a system observably refuses following an experiment on that system. By assumption, refusals can only be observed whenever the system has stabilised. In the operational semantics, described as an LTS, a failure is equivalent to not accepting certain labels in a stable state after following a weak trace. We follow the definitions of [3, 21] .
Definition 2.7. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. A state s ∈ S is stable, denoted by stable(s), if and only if τ / ∈ enabled(s).
The inputs that are no longer accepted in a stable state are refused by the system. Definition 2.8. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. For every stable state s ∈ S its refusals are defined by refusals(s) = 2 Σ\enabled(s) . For a set of states U ⊆ S its refusals are defined by
We observe that in [22] a different definition was presented where for a stable state s ∈ S the refusals are defined by refusals(s) = {X | ∃s ∈ S : (s
This definition is ambiguous in the requirement that s must be stable. If s is required to be a stable state then the only state s ∈ S such that s s is s itself by definition and as such the existential quantification is redundant. If this redundant quantification is removed we obtain Definition 2.8. Otherwise, this definition defines refusals for any state and the existential quantification is required. In [22] , for a set of states U ⊆ S the refusals of U , denoted by refusals(U ), are defined as {X | ∃s ∈ U : X ∈ refusals(s)}, which has no requirement on the stability of s. This observation also has an impact on the algorithm as shown in Section 4.
A divergence can be understood as the inability of a system to stabilise by having the possibility to perform an infinite sequence of invisible events. Definition 2.9. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. A state s ∈ S diverges, denoted by div(s), if and only if there is an infinite sequence of states s
A set of states U ⊆ S diverges if and only if it contains a diverging state, defined as div(U ) = ∃s ∈ U : div(s).
In the semantics of CSP the ability to diverge is seen as catastrophic. This means that all information about behaviour (sequences) after a divergent state is lost. This can be achieved by flooding, which means that all failures and divergences past a divergence are added, regardless of whether the LTS contains that behaviour.
Definition 2.10. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS. The divergences of a state s ∈ S are defined by divergences(s) = {ρσ ∈ Σ * | ∃t ∈ S : (s ρ t ∧ div(t))}. The minimal divergences of a state s ∈ S , denoted by divergences ⊥ (s), are the subset of divergences(s) where for all ρ ∈ divergences ⊥ (s) there is no prefix of ρ in divergences(s). We define divergences(L) to be divergences(init) and divergences ⊥ (L) to be divergences ⊥ (init).
The set of failures with
The two models of CSP obtained from these observations are the stable failures model and the failuresdivergences model. The refinement relations, induced by these models, are called stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement. For LTSs these refinement relations are obtained from the failures and divergences extracted from them. The LTS that is refined is referred to as the specification, whereas the LTS that refines the specification is referred to as the implementation.
We remark that we write the implementation LTS on the left and the specification LTS on the right of fdr , whereas the literature would define L 2 fdr L 1 . We also remark that both stable failures and failures-divergences refinement are defined differently in [22] . In [22] , the definition of stable failures refinement does not require weak trace inclusion, and the definition of failures-divergences refinement uses failures instead of failures ⊥ . These alternative definitions are different from the standard ones presented in the literature [21] .
We finish with a small example illustrating the differences between stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement.
Example 2.14. Consider the two transition systems depicted below. For simplicity, we use the initial state when referring to an LTS. Observe that we have t 0 fdr s 0 , but not t 0 sfr s 0 . The latter fails because aa is a trace of t 0 , but not of s 0 ; the same goes for the stable failure (a, {b}) of t 0 . The failures-divergences refinement holds because the divergent trace a obfuscates the observations of traces of the form aa + : since divergence is catastrophic, anything is permitted. We do have s 0 sfr t 0 but not s 0 fdr t 0 . The latter fails because the divergence a of s 0 is not present in t 0 . Stable failures refinement holds because all traces and stable failure pairs of s 0 are included in those of t 0 ; in particular, the instability of state s 1 causes s 1 not to contribute to the stable failures set of s 0 .
Operations on LTSs
In this section, we define a number of operations on labelled transition systems that are needed for the refinement checking algorithms presented later on. Each algorithm explores a synchronous product between the two LTSs on which refinement is checked.
is an LTS L = (S , init, Act, →) such that S = S 1 × S 2 and init = (init 1 , init 2 ). The transition relation → is the smallest relation that satisfies the following conditions. For all s 1 , t 1 ∈ S 1 and s 2 , t 2 ∈ S 2 :
A non deterministic specification LTS contains multiple states that can be reached by following a weak trace from the initial state. The algorithm can be simplified by only having a single state corresponding to each weak trace. This can be achieved by a normalization procedure. The normalisation of an LTS is strongly related to the determinisation of an LTS. For determinisation, an LTS can be translated to a trace equivalent deterministic LTS by means of a subset construction. In this construction the states reachable by the same trace are grouped into the same set, which is again reachable by that trace. For stable failures and failures-divergences refinement a different subset construction is used that results in a normalised LTS. This normalisation also yields a deterministic LTS, but compared to the typical determinisation it has different properties.
S , init = {s ∈ S | init s}, and → is defined as for all sets of states U, V ⊆ S and events e ∈ Σ there is a transition U e − → → V if and only if V = {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ U : s e t}.
We deliberately permit the empty set to be a state of the normalised LTS. Clearly, a normalised LTS satisfies ∅ e − → → ∅ for all events e ∈ Σ. Essentially, a transition to the empty set from a state U indicates that this event cannot be performed from any of the corresponding states of the original LTS in U . For failures-divergences refinement an alternative normalisation that does not contain the weak traces of the original LTS past a minimal divergence. While all states in an LTS in normal form are stable and not diverging, the states of the original LTS comprising a normal form state may not be. To avoid confusion when we wish to reason about the stability and divergences of states U in the LTS L underlying a normal form LTS, rather than the state of the normal form LTS, we write s U to indicate we refer to the set of states in L.
S , init = {s ∈ S | init s}, and → is defined as for all sets of states U, V ⊆ S and events e ∈ Σ there is a transition U e − → → V if and only if ¬div( s U ) and V = {t ∈ S | ∃s ∈ U : s e t}.
Properties
Next, we provide a number of characteristic properties of the definitions given above that are required in further proofs. We start with several standard properties of the synchronous product. Proof. The proof can be obtained from induction on the length of all traces in τ * . Extending this path is a trivial application of the τ -case of the synchronous product. These properties can now be extended to sequences of events. 
Next, we show a number of characteristic properties of the normalised LTS resulting from norm fdr .
Lemma 2.21. Let L be an LTS and let L = (S , init , Σ, → ) be equal to norm fdr (L). For all sequences σ ∈ Σ * and states
Proof. For every event e ∈ Σ and all states U ∈ S there can not be V, W ∈ S such that U e − → → V and U e − → → W but V = W by definition of the transition relation. Therefore L is deterministic. Now, the proof follows from induction on the length of all traces of L . Lemma 2.22. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be an LTS and let L = (S , init , Σ, → ) be equal to norm fdr (L). For all sequences ρ ∈ Σ * and states U ∈ S such that init ρ − → → U it holds that ∀s ∈ s U : init ρ s.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of all sequences in Σ * . The induction hypothesis is that for all sequences σ ∈ Σ * of length k for all states U ∈ S such that init
Base case, the empty sequence has a length of zero. By definition only init − → → init . The state init is equal to {s | init s} by definition of normalisation. Thus for every state s ∈ Ě init there is a weak transition init s by definition. Inductive case. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for all sequences ρ ∈ Σ * of length i. Take an arbitrary state V ∈ S and event e ∈ Σ such that init . For all states s ∈ s V there is a state t ∈ s U such that t e s by definition. By the induction hypothesis it holds that for all t ∈ s U there is a weak transition init ρ t. Finally, by definition of a weak transition it holds that init ρe s.
and for all states s ∈ S such that init ρ s there is a state U ∈ S such that s ∈ s U and init
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of all sequences that are not divergences or minimal divergences. The induction hypothesis is that for all sequences σ ∈ Σ * that satisfy σ / ∈ divergences(L) or σ ∈ divergences ⊥ (ρ) of length k that for all states s ∈ S if init σ s then there is a state U ∈ S such that s ∈ s U and init σ − → → U . Base case. The empty trace of length zero satisfies / ∈ divergences(L) or ∈ divergences ⊥ (ρ) by definition. We know that if init s then s ∈ Ě init , because init is defined as {s | init s} in the normalisation. We also know that init − → → init by definition. Inductive step. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for sequences ρ ∈ Σ * of length i that are not divergences or minimal divergences. Take an arbitrary state t ∈ S and event e ∈ Σ such that init ρe t
. By definition of a weak transition there is a state s ∈ S such that init ρ s and s e t. By the induction hypothesis there is a state U ∈ S such that s ∈ s U and init Lemma 2.24. Let L be an LTS and let L = (S , init , Σ, → ) be equal to norm fdr (L). For all sequences ρ ∈ Σ * and states U ∈ S it holds that if init
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of all sequences in Σ * . The induction hypothesis is that for all sequences σ ∈ Σ * of length k and states
. Base case. The empty trace of length zero. By definition, only init − → → init . We know that init = {t ∈ S | init t} by the definition of normalisation. If ¬div( Ě init ) then for all t ∈ S such that init t it holds that ¬div(t) by definition of diverges and by construction. Thus / ∈ divergences(L) by definition of divergences.
Inductive step. Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for all sequence ρ ∈ Σ * of length i. Take an arbitrary state V ∈ S and event e ∈ Σ such that init From the induction hypothesis follows that ρ / ∈ divergences(L). From lemmas 2.21 and 2.23 it follows for any state t ∈ S such that init ρe t that t ∈ s V and thus from ¬div( s V ) follows that ¬div(t) by definition of diverges. Therefore, ρe / ∈ divergences(L) by definition of divergences.
Proof. For the empty trace of length zero. By definition / ∈ weaktraces(L) if and only if init is empty, as init is equal to {s ∈ S | init s} in the normalisation and only init − → → init by definition. =⇒ ). Proof by induction on the length of all sequences in ρ ∈ Σ * . The induction hypothesis is that for all sequences σ ∈ Σ * of length
The base case was already established, so for the inductive step. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for all sequences ρ ∈ Σ * of length i. Assume an arbitrary event e ∈ Σ such that ρe / ∈ divergences(L) ∪ weaktraces(L). From ρe / ∈ weaktraces(L) follows that there is no state t ∈ S such that init ρe t by definition. From ρe / ∈ divergences(L) follows that ρ / ∈ divergences(L) by definition. Now there are two cases to distinguish.
Case ρ / ∈ weaktraces(L). From the induction hypothesis follows that init and 2.21 there is a unique state U ∈ S where for all s ∈ S such that init ρ s it holds that s ∈ s U and init ρ − → → U . From the observation that ρe / ∈ weaktraces(L) and ρ ∈ weaktraces(L) and the definition of a weak transition follows that for all s ∈ S where init ρ s there can not be a state t ∈ S such that s e t.
As such U ∈ divergences(L). From Lemma 2.21 and 2.23 follows that for every state s ∈ S such that init ρ s that s ∈ s U . From the definition of normalisation follows that for every s ∈ s U there is no state t ∈ S such that s e t. Therefore init ρe t does not exists by definition of a weak transition and thus ρe / ∈ weaktraces(L).
For a normalized LTS resulting from norm sfr we remark that Lemma 2.23 holds for any sequence and Lemma 2.25 holds for any weak trace ρ / ∈ weaktraces(L). We use 2.23' and 2.25' when applying these lemmas to an LTS resulting from norm sfr .
Refinement Checking
First, we present the decision procedure that the antichain-based algorithms use to decide whether a refinement exists between an implementation LTS and a specification LTS.
The number of failures and divergences of a given LTS can be infinite and as such it is not viable to compute them directly. However, in [13] an algorithm is presented to decide the existence of a refinement relation. The first step of the algorithm is to mark all diverging states in both LTSs. Then, the algorithm explores the state pairs of the synchronised product between the implementation and the normalisation of the specification. For each of the explored pairs the algorithm locally decides whether the refinement relation is violated. The pair for which the refinement is violated is referred to as a witness. This witness is different for stable failures and failures-divergences refinement. For stable failures the state space of
is explored for the following so-called SF-witness:
is called an SF-witness if and only if at least one of the following conditions hold:
• stable(s) and refusals(s) refusals( s U ).
For failures-divergences refinement the state space of
is explored for an FDR-witness, which has additional conditions regarding divergences.
is called an FDR-witness if and only if ¬div( s U ) and at least one of the following conditions hold:
• div(s).
The following theorem is the reason for the ability to locally decide the existence of a refinement relation by searching for such an FDR-witness.
) that is an FDR-witness. By definition of reachable we can pick a weak trace ρ ∈ weaktraces(L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 )) such that init ρ (s, U ). From the assumption that (s, U ) is an FDR-witness follows that ¬div( s U ) and so ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ) by Lemma 2.24. By Lemmas 2.20 and 2.22 it holds that init 1 ρ 1 s and for all u ∈ s U it holds that init 2 ρ 2 u. From the assumption that (s, U ) is an FDR-witness follows that ¬div( s U ) and from Lemma 2.24 follows that ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ). For (s, U ) to be an FDR witness there are three cases:
Case U = ∅ ∧ ¬div(s). From ¬div(s) follows that there is a state t ∈ S 1 such that init 1 ρ t and stable(t). So, there is a failure (ρ, X) ∈ failures ⊥ (L 1 ), for some X ⊆ Σ. By Lemma 2.25 it holds that the weak trace ρ ending in the empty set is not a weak trace of L 2 . Together with ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ) follows, for all possible refusal sets X ⊆ Σ, that (ρ, X) / ∈ failures ⊥ (L 2 ) which leads to a contradiction with the assumption that
where s can stably refuse X ∈ refusals(s), but X / ∈ refusals( s U ). By Lemma 2.21 there is no state U of the normalised LTS such that U = U that can be reached by following weak trace ρ. Together with ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ) follows that (ρ, X) / ∈ failures ⊥ (L 2 ), which leads to a contradiction with the assumption that
Case div(s). We know that ρ ∈ divergences(L 1 ) by definition of divergences. However, by ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ) this leads to a contradiction with the assumption that divergences(
. Now, there are two cases to consider.
as otherwise no such failure (ρ, X) exists by the flooding of failures ⊥ (L 2 ). There is a stable state s ∈ S 1 such that init 1 ρ s and X ∈ refusals(s) by definition of a failure. There are two cases for the weak trace ρ to distinguish.
Case ρ / ∈ weaktraces(L 2 ). By Lemma 2.25 this means that ρ is a trace leading to the empty set in norm fdr (L 2 ). By Lemma 2.20 there is a pair (s, ∅) such that init ρ (s, ∅) and that pair is a reachable FDR-witness by definition thus leading to the contradiction that there is no reachable FDR-witness.
by assumption. By Lemmas 2.21 and 2.23 there is a unique state V of norm fdr (L 2 ) reachable via weak trace ρ such that for all t ∈ S 2 where init 2 ρ 2 t holds that t ∈ s V . Thus X / ∈ refusals(t) by definition of a failure and X / ∈ refusals( s V ) by definition of union. Therefore refusals(s) refusals( s V ). By Lemma 2.20 the pair (s, V ) is reachable and it is an FDR-witness by definition thus leading to a contradiction with the assumption that there is no reachable FDR-witness.
•
. In this case there is a prefix of ρ, which we call σ, that leads to a diverging state init σ s by definition of divergences. However, by the assumption that ρ / ∈ divergences(L 2 ) we know that all states t ∈ S 2 reached by following σ are not diverging. Again, by Lemmas 2.21 and 2.23 the weak trace σ in L 2 results in a unique state U of norm fdr (L 2 ). Therefore state pair (s, U ) is an FDR-witness, because div(s) but ¬div( s U ). Thus leading to the contradiction that there is no reachable FDR-witness.
For stable failures refinement we state a similar theorem that relates the SF-witness and stable failures refinement.
) that is an SF-witness and show that this leads to a contradiction. As the pair (s, U ) is reachable there is a weak trace ρ ∈ weaktraces(L 1 × norm sfr (L 2 )) such that init ρ (s, U ). By Lemmas 2.20 and 2.22 it holds that init 1 ρ 1 s and for all u ∈ s U it holds that init 2 ρ 2 u. For (s, U ) to be an SF-witness there are two cases: Case U = ∅. By Lemma 2.25' it holds that the weak trace ρ ending in the empty set is not a weak trace of L 2 . Therefore, ρ / ∈ weaktraces(L 2 ), which contradicts with the assumption that weaktraces(
where s can stably refuse X ∈ refusals(s), but X / ∈ refusals( s U ). By Lemma 2.21 there is no other state U of the normalised LTS such that U = U that can be reached by following weak trace ρ. So, (ρ, X) / ∈ failures(L 2 ), which leads to a contradiction with the observation that failures(
. Again, we prove this by contradiction. Assume that L 1 sfr L 2 . By definition of the stable failures refinement this means that failures(L 1 ) failures(L 2 ) or weaktraces(L 1 ) weaktraces(L 2 ). Now, there are two cases to consider.
• Case weaktraces(L 1 ) weaktraces(L 2 ). Pick a weak trace ρ ∈ weaktraces(L 1 ) such that ρ / ∈ weaktraces(L 2 ). So, there is a state s ∈ S 1 such that init 1 ρ 1 s. By Lemma 2.25' it holds that ρ leads to the empty set in norm sfr (L 2 ). By Lemma 2.20 the pair (s, ∅) is a reachable SF-witness by definition. This leads to a contradiction that there is no reachable SF-witness.
. There is a stable state such that init 1 ρ 1 s and X ∈ refusals(s) by definition of a failure.
by definition of failure, which leads to the same contradiction as in the weaktraces(L 1 ) weaktraces(L 2 ) case.
∈ failures(L 2 ) by assumption. By Lemmas 2.21 and 2.23' weak trace ρ leads to a unique state U in norm fdr (L 2 ) such that for all t ∈ S 2 where init 2 ρ 2 t it holds that t ∈ s U . For all t ∈ s U it holds that X / ∈ refusals(t) by definition of a failure, and as such X / ∈ refusals( s U ) by definition of union. Therefore, refusals(s) refusals( s U ). By Lemma 2.20 the pair (s, U ) is reachable and it is an SF-witness by definition. Thus leading to a contradiction with the assumption that there is no reachable FDR-witness.
Antichain Algorithms for Refinement Checking
The previously explained decision procedure requires the whole state space of the synchronous product to be explored when there is no witness. In that case, the subset construction of the specification LTS dominates the theoretical worst-case run time of refinement checking. As observed in [22] this can be improved by exploiting an antichain approach to potentially reduce the state space of the normalised specification. An antichain is a subset of incomparable elements from a partially ordered set. Definition 4.1. Let X be a set and ≤ ⊆ X × X a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation. Then (X, ≤) is a partially ordered set. Definition 4.2. Let (X, ≤) be a partially ordered set. A set A ⊆ X is an antichain iff for all x, y ∈ A with x = y it holds that x y and y x.
An antichain A over a partially ordered set (X, ≤) supports two operations. The operation checks whether a given element is included within A. Let x ∈ X be an element. We denote x A if and only if there is an element y ∈ A such that y ≤ x. This can also be extended to a set of elements. Let U ⊆ X be a set of elements. Then U ∀ A if and only if for all y ∈ U it holds that y A. The operation inserts a state pair into A and removes all larger pairs. Formally A x results in the set {(y | y ∈ A ∧ x y} ∪ {x}. Note that this operation only results in an antichain whenever x A.
As [22] suggests the state space of the synchronised product induces a partially ordered set as follows. For pairs of states (s, U ) and (t, V ) of L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ) we define an ordering such that (s, U ) ≤ (t, V ) if and only if s = t and U ⊆ V . A fundamental property for the correctness of the antichain-based refinement checking is expressed in the following lemma. We note that this property holds due to the allowance of the empty set in the normalised LTS.
From the state pair ordering we can observe that smaller state pairs lead to larger refusal sets, by observing that the refusals of a set are defined as the union of all stable states. Similarly, if a set of states of the specification does not diverge, then any subset of this set does not diverge either. The proof of this property is in Section 5.
We remark that in [22, Proposition 1] a similar lemma was stated where for states (s, V ) ≤ (s, U ) the traces can be mimicked and preserve (t, V ) ≤ (t, U ). This property is correct for norm sfr (L 2 ), but not for norm fdr (L 2 ) as div( s U ) does not necessarily imply div( s V ) whenever U ⊆ V . We use our reformulated Lemma 4.3 to prove the correctness of the antichain algorithm.
The idea for the antichain-based algorithm is that the normalisation of the specification and the synchronisation is computed on-the-fly. The antichain is then used to keep track of the already explored subset of the combined state space resulting by recording the smallest state pairs already explored. If a larger state pair is encountered during the exploration, further exploration is unnecessary, thereby pruning the state space.
First, we present the algorithm that was introduced in [22] . The algorithm takes an implementation LTS L 1 and a specification LTS L 2 . A working stack is used to keep track of state pairs that still have to be explored. When a new state pair is discovered it is not added back to working if it is already recorded in the antichain. We remark that the pseudocode for both stable failures and failures-divergences refinement checking have been combined and can be selected by means of a boolean flag CheckDiv.
Algorithm 1
The erroneous refinement checking algorithm as presented in [22] . For LTSs
let working be a stack containing a pair (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s})
let antichain ← ∅
4:
while working = ∅ do
5:
pop (impl , spec) from working 6: antichain ← antichain (impl , spec)
7:
if CheckDiv ∧ div(impl ) then if refusals(impl ) refusals(spec) then
12:
return false
13:
for impl e − → → 1 impl do 14: if e = τ then 15: spec ← spec 16:
spec ← {s ∈ S 2 | ∃s ∈ spec : s e 2 s }
18:
if spec = ∅ then 19: return false 20: if (impl , spec ) antichain then 21: push (impl , spec ) into working According to the failures-divergences refinement of [22] , however, the algorithm should return false, since failures(s 3 ) ⊆ failures(s 2 ) fails to hold: we have (a, {a}) ∈ failures(s 3 ) but not (a, {a}) ∈ failures(s 2 ).
The problem with checking failures-divergences refinement as defined in Definition 2.13 is that whenever CheckDiv is true the algorithm does not explore the state space of L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ) correctly. Therefore if CheckDiv is true the resulting witness does not necessarily satisfy ¬div( Ě spec) and thus might not be a valid FDR-witness.
We note that the algorithm explores the synchronous product of the specification and implementation in a depth-first, on-the-fly manner. However, for the purpose of generating counterexamples it would be favourable to use a breadth-first search to ensure conciseness of the resulting trace leading to a witness.
Algorithm 1 can easily be changed to a breadth-first variant by using a FIFO (First in, first out) queue instead of a stack as the data structure of working. However, the breadth-first variant of the above algorithm suffers from an enormous performance degradation. A number of performance problems can be identified in the original algorithm, which are also present (albeit less pronounced in practice) in the depth-first exploration:
1. On line 11 the refusal check is also performed on unstable states, which results in a potential unnecessary and expensive search for stable states.
2. Adding the pair (impl , spec) that is taken from working to antichain at that moment results in redundant (even duplicate) pairs being added to working. Namely all successors of (impl , spec) might be added if they did not already occur in antichain before.
3. Contrary to the explicit claim in [22, Section 2.2] the variable antichain is not guaranteed to be an antichain.
The first problem can easily be identified as unnecessary overhead and is also wrong according to our corrected definition of refusals. However, the second and third problems are more difficult to see and we construct two examples to explain them in more detail. Example 4.5 illustrates the second problem. Each labelled transition system in this class has n states and k * (n − 1) transitions. The refinement relation that is checked is L k n sfr L k n . Note that this class of LTSs is completely deterministic and they contain no τ -transitions. The state pairs that are added to antichain are (s i , {s i }) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Algorithm 1 exploring depth-first will add the state reachable via a single step once for every event, because (s i+1 , {s i+1 }) is only added to antichain after (s i , {s i }) has finished exploring its outgoing transitions. This occurs in every state, because the state reached via such a transition was not visited before, resulting in a maximum working stack size of O(n * k) entries. Now every state is part of antichain, so every state taken from working will visit all of its successors and conclude that they are already part of the antichain. This results in a total of O(n * k 2 ) antichain inclusion checks. The breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 requires even more antichain inclusion tests. Similarly to the depth-first variant it also adds the state reachable via a single step once for every event for the same reason. However, now (s i+1 , {s i+1 }) is only added to the antichain after all k copies of (s i , {s i }) are taken from the working, which is now a FIFO queue. Therefore each element in working adds k elements before it is added to antichain, resulting in a maximum queue size of O(k n ) at state (s 1 , {s 1 }). This results in O(k n+1 ) antichain inclusion checks.
Next, we present an example where the antichain is not guaranteed to remain an antichain as an illustration of the third problem.
Example 4.6. Consider the two left-most labelled transition systems depicted below, along with the (normalisation) of the synchronous product on the right.
Algorithm 1 starts with working containing (s 0 , {t 0 }) and an empty antichain. When exploring (s 0 , {t 0 }) the reached states (s 1 , {t 1 }) and (s 1 , {t 1 , t 2 }) are not part of the antichain {(s 0 , {t 0 })}. So these pairs will be added to the working queue. The pair (s 1 , {t 1 }) from the working stack is the next to be considered and it will be added to the antichain resulting in {(s 0 , {t 0 }), (s 1 , {t 1 })}. In the next iteration the pair (s 1 , {t 1 , t 2 }) is popped from working and will be added to antichain, resulting in the set {(s 0 , {t 0 }), (s 1 , {t 1 }), (s 1 , {t 1 , t 2 })}. Clearly, the resulting antichain is no longer an antichain, as (s 1 , {t 1 }) ≤ (s 1 , {t 1 , t 2 }).
A Correct and Improved Antichain Algorithm
Our corrected algorithm addresses the identified issues with a number of changes. The first performance problem can be solved by only performing the refusal check whenever the implementation state is stable and by computing the refusals according to Definition 2.8. Solving the second performance problem is more involved. The essential observation here is that in order for the information in antichain to be most effective, states of the synchronous product must be added to antichain as soon as these are discovered, even if these have not yet been fully explored. Effectively we maintain the invariant that working ∀ antichain. This can be achieved by adding the initial state pair and all explored pairs to antichain upon discovery. In turn, this also resolves the third issue, as only state pairs that are not included in antichain get added.
Finally, the on-the-fly normalisation when searching for an FDR-witness was changed such that it only continues with the current state pair whenever spec does not diverge, effectively following Definition 2.17. This is achieved by exchanging the conditions of these if-statements for the divergence checks. Algorithm 2 contains the corrected algorithm for checking stable failures and failures-divergences refinement.
Algorithm 2
The corrected refinement checking algorithm. For LTSs L i = (S i , init i , Act i , → i ) where i ∈ {1, 2} the algorithm returns true iff L 1 refines L 2 . This algorithm decides stable failures refinement if CheckDiv is false and failures-divergences refinement otherwise.
let working be a queue containing a pair (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s}) 3: let antichain ← ∅ (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s}) 4: while working = ∅ do 5: pop (impl , spec) from working 6: if ¬CheckDiv ∨ ¬div(spec) then 7: if CheckDiv ∧ div(impl ) then if stable(impl ) ∧ refusals(impl ) refusals(spec) then 11: return false 12: for impl e − → → 1 impl do 13: if e = τ then 14: spec ← spec 15: else 16: spec ← {s ∈ S 2 | ∃s ∈ spec : s if spec = ∅ then 18: return false 19: if (impl , spec ) antichain then 20: antichain ← antichain (impl , spec ) 21: push (impl , spec ) into working 22: return true Consider Example 4.5 again, but now checking stable failures refinement using Algorithm 2. The depthfirst variant of this algorithm only adds the successor state to the working stack once, because for every other outgoing transition it was already part of antichain when it is discovered. This results in a maximum working stack size of at most O(1) entries. For each state and each successor antichain inclusion is checked once, resulting in O(n * k) checks. This is an improvement compared to the depth-first variant of Algorithm 1 of a factor n * k in the maximum working stack size and a factor k in the number of inclusion checks. For the breadth-first variant the bounds are exactly the same, i.e., maximum O(1) working queue size and O(n * k) number of inclusion checks. This is an improvement compared to the breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 of a factor k n in the working queue size and a factor k n /n in the number of antichain inclusion checks.
The correctness of Algorithm 2 is captured by the following theorem, which is repeated at the end of this section with an explicit proof.
• refines new (L 1 , L 2 , false) returns true if and only if L 1 sfr L 2 .
• refines new (L 1 , L 2 , true) returns true if and only if L 1 fdr L 2 .
We focus on the proof of correctness with respect to failures-divergences refinement; for stable failures refinement the proof is virtually the same. As the corrected algorithm fundamentally differs from Algorithm 1, we cannot reuse arguments for the proof of correctness presented in [22] , which are based on invariants that do not hold in our case.
First we show termination of Algorithm 2. An important observation of antichain is that adding elements to it does not affect the -inclusion of other elements, i.e., pairs that are -included remain included after any insertion.
Lemma 5.2. Let A be an antichain of a partially ordered set (Z, ≤). For any elements X, U ∈ Z such that U A and X A the statement U (A X) holds.
Proof. Assume arbitrary elements U, X ∈ Z such that U A and X A. Recall that the definition of A X results in an antichain {V | V ∈ A ∧ X V } ∪ {X}, because X A by assumption.
Case X ≤ U . Then U (A X) follows from the fact that X ∈ A X. Case X U . There is an element V ∈ A such that V ≤ U by assumption that U A. Because X U and V ≤ U we also know that X V . Consequently, V ∈ (A X) and thus also U (A X).
Next, we show that all processed pairs do not get added back to the working stack. We define a ghost variable Done that contains the set of state pairs that have been processed, i.e., a pair was taken from working and the outer while loop has finished one iteration. In Appendix A the exact introduction of variable Done into Algorithm 2 is shown. Now, we first prove that all states in Done and working are reachable. Proof. Initially, the pair (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 s}) is reachable by the empty trace because this pair is the initial state of L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ) by definition. So working only consisting of this pair is reachable as well, and Done is empty.
Maintenance. For every state (impl , spec) ∈ Done ∪ working there is a trace σ ∈ Act * , such that 
. From the observation that (impl , spec) was reachable we can conclude that Done ∪ {(impl , spec)} is a subset of reachable as well.
Next, we show that every pair gets visited at most once and then is added to Done by a number of observations. We show that working contains no duplicates by showing that all pairs in working are already part of the antichain and thus do not get added again. For the purpose of identifying elements in the stack we define, for a given index i, the notation working i to represent the ith pair on the stack, or queue respectively. Furthermore we formalize that pairs in Done do not get added back to working from the observation that they already occur in antichain and that therefore Done and working are disjoint.
where i ∈ {1, 2} be two LTSs and CheckDiv is true. The following invariant holds in the outer while loop (lines 4-21) of Algorithm 2.
Proof. Initially, the initial pair is both added to working and antichain, and Done is empty. Maintenance. Let Done be equal to Done ∪ {(impl , spec)}. By the assumption that Invariant I holds we know at line 5 that (impl , spec) antichain from the assumption that working ∀ antichain. This ensures that Done ∀ antichain and (working \ {(impl , spec)}) ∀ antichain holds by definition. Furthermore we know that (impl , spec) / ∈ (working \ {(impl , spec)}) from ∀i = j : working i = working j . From this it follows that Done ∩ (working \ {(impl , spec)}) = ∅.
At line 19, from (impl , spec ) antichain, we know that there is no pair (s, U ) ∈ antichain such that (s, U ) ≤ (impl , spec ). From the observation that Done ∪ working ∀ antichain it holds that if (impl , spec ) ∈ Done ∪ working then there is a pair (t, V ) ∈ antichain such that (t, V ) ≤ (impl , spec ).
However, that leads to a contradiction with the observation that there is no pair (s, U ) ∈ antichain such that (s, U ) ≤ (impl , spec ) thus (impl , spec ) / ∈ Done ∪ working. Let working be equal to {(impl , spec )} ∪ working \ {(impl , spec)}). From the fact that (impl , spec ) / ∈ working follows that ∀i = j : working i = working j holds. At line 20 the (impl , spec ) pair is added to antichain and Lemma 5.2 ensures that Done ∪ working ∀ antichain holds. From the observation that (impl , spec ) / ∈ Done ∪working and Done ∩(working \{(impl , spec)}) = ∅ we can also conclude that Done ∩working = ∅ at line 21.
Observe that Lemma 5.3 implies that all states in working are reachable states from L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ). Using Lemma 5.4 we can now prove termination by showing that all pairs will only be processed once and as such Algorithm 2 terminates for finite state, finitely branching labelled transition systems. This is formalized in the following theorem.
where i ∈ {1, 2} be two LTSs and CheckDiv is true. If the sets of states S 1 and S 2 are finite then Algorithm 2 terminates.
Proof. The inner for-loop is bounded as the number of outgoing transitions → 1 is finite. The total number of state pairs in L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ) is finite since S 1 and S 2 are finite. From Lemma 5.3 it follows that Done is a subset of the reachable state pairs. As Done ∩ working = ∅ by Lemma 5.4 we conclude that Done strictly increases with every iteration. So, only a finite number of iterations of the outer for-loop are possible.
These observations also hold for stable failures refinement checking. The only difference is that in Lemma 5.3 we can observe that (spec, e, spec ) is a transition in the LTS resulting from norm sfr (L 2 ). Note that although we do not discuss the theoretical worst-case complexity of the improved algorithm these observations already give an upper bound on the number of states that can be explored. Especially the absence of duplicates in working and the maximisation of antichain following from Done ∪ working ∀ antichain do not hold for Algorithm 1.
Now we prove the correctness of the already presented Lemma 4.3 and generalise it to traces.
Proof. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be equal to L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ) and let L = (S 2 , init 2 , Act 2 , → 2 ) be equal to norm fdr (L 2 ). Take any two state pairs such that (s, U ) ≤ (s, V ). Pick an arbitrary pair (t, V ) ∈ S such that (s, V ) e − → → (t, V ). Now there are two cases to distinguish. Case e = τ . By definition of the product a transition s τ − → → 1 t exists and V = V . So there is also a transition (s, U )
Case e = τ . By definition of the product there are transitions s 
Proof. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be equal to L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ). The proof uses induction on the length of all sequences in Act * . The induction hypothesis is that for all states (s, V ), (t, V ) ∈ S and sequences
Base case, the empty trace of length zero. Take two pairs (s, U ), (s, V ) ∈ S satisfying (s, U ) ≤ (s, V ). The empty trace can only reach (s, U ) − → → (s, U ), similar for (s, V ), and as such (s, U ) ≤ (s, V ) follows by assumption.
Inductive step. Suppose that the induction hypothesis holds for all traces σ ∈ Act * of length i. Take an arbitrary state (t, V ) and event e ∈ Act such that (r, V )
Take an arbitrary state (r, U ) ≤ (r, V ). By Lemma 4.3 and the existence of (s, V ) U ) ≤ (s, V ) . Therefore, by definition of a trace (r, U ) σe −→ → (t, U ), and (t, U ) ≤ (t, V ) was already established.
Next, we formalise the property that if a state pair is an FDR-witness then any smaller state pair is also an FDR-witness. This can be combined with the previous lemma to obtain the property that if a state pair can reach an FDR-witness then a smaller state pair can also reach an FDR-witness.
From the definition of an FDR-witness it follows that ¬div( s V ) and one of the following holds:
From the definition of refusals we know that refusals( s U
where (s, U ) ≤ (s, V ) and for every sequence σ ∈ Σ * τ it holds that if (s, V ) can reach an FDR-witness with σ then (s, U ) can reach an FDR-witness with σ as well.
. By the definition of reachable pick (t, V ) to be an FDR-witness and σ ∈ Σ * τ a trace such that (s, V )
From lemma 5.7 and the assumption that (t, V ) is an FDR-witness it follows that state (t, U ) must be an FDR-witness as well. Therefore, (t, U ) is a reachable FDR-witness with the trace σ starting in (s, U ).
Next, we define a predicate for the existence of an FDR-witness and a function that computes the distance to the closest FDR-witness.
, let FDR(U ) be the predicate that is true if and only if there is an FDR-witness in U .
. For a state s ∈ S , let Dist(s) ∈ N∪{∞} denote the shortest distance from state s to an FDR-witness or ∞ when none are reachable, formally
where min{∅} is equal to ∞. For a set of states U ⊆ S , let Dist(U ) denote the shortest distance among all states in U , formally
The following lemma relates the reachability of an FDR-witness for smaller state pairs to the minimal distance.
Proof. Let L = (S , init, Act, →) be equal to L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ). Take arbitrary states (s, U ), (s, V ) ∈ S satisfying (s, U ) ≤ (s, V ). From Lemma 5.8 it follows that if (s, V ) can reach an FDR-witness by the shortest trace σ then (s, U ) can also reach an FDR-witness with trace σ, which by definition means that Dist((s, U )) ≤ Dist ((s, V ) ).
The last lemma implies that whenever a pair is removed from the antichain due to an insertion, the inserted (smaller) state pair has a shorter or equal distance to its closest FDR-witness. This property can be used to show that the algorithm always gets closer to an FDR-witness during exploration and that pruning parts of the statespace does not remove all existing FDR-witnesses from the reachable states. The latter property is captured by the following lemmas.
. Take an arbitrary state (s, U ) ∈ S such that div( s U ). For any event e ∈ Σ and state V ∈ S 2 there is no transition U e − → → 2 V by definition of the normalization. Therefore, by definition of the product and Lemma 2.18, for any state (t, V ) ∈ S such that (s, U ) (t, V ) it holds that U = V . Thus, any reachable state (t, V ) also satisfies div( s V ) and as such can not be an FDR-witness, meaning that Dist((s, U )) is ∞.
where i ∈ {1, 2} be two LTSs and CheckDiv is true. If FDR(reachable(L 1 × norm fdr (L 2 ))) holds then Invariant II holds for every iteration of the while loop at line 4 of Algorithm 2:
holds, so there is a reachable FDR-witness. Initialisation. Done is empty, so Dist(Done) = Dist(∅) = ∞. For working, which at this point only contains the initial state, the witness is reachable and so Dist(working) < ∞. The initial state is also added to antichain. Thus Dist(Done) > Dist(working) ∧ Dist(working) = Dist(antichain).
Maintenance. Assume that working = ∅ and Dist(Done) > Dist(working) ∧ Dist(working) = Dist(antichain). At line 5 a pair (impl , spec) is taken from working, so working becomes equal to working \(impl , spec). Let Done be equal to Done ∪{(impl , spec)} and let N be equal to Dist ((impl , spec) ). There are three cases to distinguish.
Case N > Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}). Removing (impl , spec) from working did not change its distance, so Dist(working) = Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}). Adding this pair to Done, because N > Dist(working), results in Dist(working) < Dist(Done ) ≤ Dist(Done). Consider the outgoing transitions at line 12. These (impl , spec ) pairs must have a distance of at least Dist(working), because N − 1 ≥ Dist(working). Let working be equal to working ∪ {(impl , spec )}. Adding any of them to working at line 21 does not change its minimal distance. Let antichain be antichain if (impl , spec ) was not inserted and antichain (impl , spec ) otherwise. By the invariant follows that N −1 ≥ Dist(antichain) and so by Lemma 5.11 if (impl , spec ) is inserted into antichain its distance will not change. Therefore, Dist(Done ) > Dist(working ) ∧ Dist(working ) = Dist(antichain ).
Case 0 < N ≤ Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}). Note that N = Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}). From Lemma 5.12 follows that ¬div( Ě spec) and so the successors of (impl , spec) are explored. As 0 < N , there must be some successors (impl , spec ) at line 12 such that Dist((impl , spec )) < N . Towards a contradiction, assume that one of these successors (impl , spec ) is included in antichain, i.e., (impl , spec ) antichain. In that case, Dist((impl , spec )) ≥ Dist(antichain) by Lemma 5.11. Consequently, it follows that Dist((impl , spec )) ≥ Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}) = N , which contradicts with Dist((impl , spec )) < N . Therefore, none of them should already be included in antichain. Let working be equal to working ∪ {(impl , spec )}. For some successor (impl , spec ) antichain that is added to working at line 21, we observe that Dist((impl , spec )) < Dist((impl , spec)) and as such Dist(working ) < Dist(working ∪ {(impl , spec)}). Therefore also Dist(working ) < Dist(Done ∪ {(impl , spec)}). Finally, Dist(antichain {(impl , spec )}) = Dist(working ) follows from Dist(impl , spec ) < Dist(antichain) and Lemma 5.13.
Case N = 0. The state (impl , spec) is checked for the FDR-witness conditions and the algorithm terminates. Now we can conclude the proof of correctness for Algorithm 2.
Theorem 5.14. Algorithm 2 returns false if and only if an FDR-witness is reachable in the product of L 1 and norm fdr (L 2 ).
Proof. =⇒ ) Assume that Algorithm 2 returns false. This only occurs when the current (impl , spec) pair satisfies the conditions of an FDR-witness, as shown in lines 6, 7, 10 and 17 of Algorithm 2. All pairs taken from working are reachable according to Lemma 5.3 , so this FDR-witness is also reachable.
⇐= ) Assume that an FDR-witness is reachable in the product of L 1 and norm fdr (L 2 ). Towards a contradiction, assume that Algorithm 2 returns true. The Invariant II of Lemma 5.13 is equal to Dist(Done) > Dist(working) ∧ Dist(working) = Dist(antichain). The algorithm returns true if and only if working is empty, which means that Dist(working) = Dist(∅) = ∞. The initial state init of L 1 and norm fdr (L 2 ) is equal to (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s})) and can reach an FDR-witness by assumption. Therefore, Dist(init) < ∞. Initially init was inserted into antichain so by Lemma 5.2 follows that init antichain and from Lemma 5.11 follows that Dist(antichain) < ∞, which leads to a contradiction.
• 
Experimental Validation
We have conducted several experiments to compare both algorithms to show that solving the indicated performance problems actually improves the run time of antichain-based refinement checking.
We have implemented a depth-first and breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in a branch of the mCRL2 1 toolset [4] as part of the ltscompare tool. Both implementations use the same data structures and compute most concepts, e.g., the antichain inclusion and insertion, in the same way. The implementation of Algorithm 2 performs the check at line 10 according to the correct refusal definition presented in Definition 2.8, whereas, the implementation of Algorithm 1 computes the refusal check according to the definition given in [22] . Algorithm 1 applies refusals to any, possibly unstable, implementation and specification states. Therefore, for Algorithm 1 we have implemented the refusals computation for any state, omitting the requirement that the given state is stable.
A downloadable package [11] was created that contains the source code and the benchmark files. In the following measurements, the ltscompare tool has been built using Clang 7.0.0 in the release configuration. The measurements have been performed on a machine with the following hardware specification:
• Intel Core i7-7700HQ CPU 2.80GHz
• Memory: 16GiB limit imposed by ulimit -Sv 16777216
The input models are taken from three sources. First, Example 4.5 is benchmarked for various input combinations to show the asymptotic behaviour in practice. Second, six mCRL2 specifications were obtained from a master thesis that investigates the correctness of various concurrent data structures modelled in mCRL2 [12] . In that thesis weak trace equivalence was used to show the linearisability of these data structures. This is similar to the benchmarks related to linearisability that were performed in [22] . For benchmarking purposes we check the stronger stable failures and failures-divergences refinement relations between the implementation and specification pairs. Finally, a single industrial model, a control system modelled in the Dezyne language [17] , is also included in the benchmarks as it was the first instance that exposed the performance issues. However, for confidentiality reasons, this model is not made publicly available.
Benchmarking Example 4.5
Example 4.5 has been benchmarked for all combinations of parameters n, k ∈ {10, 20, . . . , 500} checking for the stable failures refinement L k n sfr L k n . Figure 1 shows the run time in seconds in a three dimensional plot for all combinations of n and k using the depth-first variants of both algorithms. These plots show a quadratic growth of Algorithm 1 in the parameter k and a linear growth in the parameter n. For Algorithm 2 the asymptotic growth is linear in both k and n. These observed growths match the analysis that was presented in Example 4.5 for Algorithm 1 and on page 14 for Algorithm 2. Note that the scale of the vertical axis, displaying the run time, differs by two orders of magnitude and the highest runtime (for the n = 500 and k = 500 case) of Algorithm 1 is a factor 170 higher than that of Algorithm 1. We observe that due to the absence of τ -transitions, there is no performance difference in the computation of refusals in both algorithms. Consequently, the difference in performance is entirely due to the different way of inspecting and extending working and antichain.
The breadth-first variant of Algorithm 1 was unable to complete the smallest (10, 10) case within the given memory limit. However, for the corrected algorithm breadth-first the run time performance is almost equivalent to its depth-first variant, as shown in Figure 2 . 
Benchmarking Practical Examples
The next set of experiments consists of more typical refinement checking questions, assessing whether the behaviour of the implementation are indeed allowed by the corresponding specification in stable failures semantics. In Table 1 the origin of each benchmark, the number of states and transitions of each implementation and specification LTS, and whether the stable failures refinement relation holds is shown. The run time results, in seconds, for both algorithms to decide the existence of a refinement relation can be found in Table 2 . We use † to indicate that the algorithm failed to complete within the given 16GiB limit. No experiment failed to complete within a time limit of 10 minutes. Each measurement shown is the average of five different runs. Here, we observe that for the depth-first variant both algorithms perform similarly with a small performance advantage for Algorithm 2. However, for the breadth-first variants our algorithm is able to complete all benchmarks, whereas, Algorithm 1f is only able to complete two within the given memory limit.
To gain more insight into the performance differences between both algorithms we repeat the benchmarks and report a number of performance metrics. The metrics are the maximum working size and the number of antichain checks that fail (misses), succeeded (hits) and the maximum antichain size during the exploration. Note that the antichain size can decrease by inserting elements, because more than one pair could be removed as a result of an insertion.
The following two tables show the discussed metrics for depth-first variant of both algorithms. Here, we can observe that for all experiments except for the industrial and pracNonBlock benchmarks the measurements are identical. This difference can be explained by the different refusal computation used as the refusal definition presented in [22] can search for an FDR-witness in a number of steps bypassing the exploration with working. For the other cases, the only difference in performance can be obtained from the different refusal computation, as the antichain and working operations are computed in the same way.
The following two tables show the metrics for the breadth-first variants of both algorithms. coarseSet  3411  96167  60332  55444  fineGrainedSet 434  7192  9657  5077  lazySet  1748  24340  35192  24496  optimisticSet  15209  292525  434218  234352  pracNonBlock 338  3426  4032  2675  treiberStack  139218  2411614  1523830  214795  industrial  2243  36369  43090  43091 From these results it becomes clear that especially for the breadth-first variant delaying the insertion of state pairs into antichain results in many pairs failing the antichain check. Each pair that fails the check is added to working, which causes it to grow very rapidly. For Algorithm 2 we can observe that the working queue is larger than the depth-first variant due to the "width" of the state space. This also explains the slightly worse run time of breadth-first compared to depth-first even for a successful refinement check.
To confirm that the run time improvements are due to the refusal optimisation we have implemented another variant of Algorithm 1 with the stability check of impl added, but using the original refusal definition. As expected the run time for the depth-first variant now matches the results of the corrected algorithm more closely. However, for the breadth-first case the industrial run time is greatly reduced, but the benchmark pracNonBlock performs (much) worse. This can be explained due to the fact that in a failing refinement the exploration stops when a suitable (SF-)witness has been found. In this case it is more efficient to directly search the witness in the refusal calculation instead of continuing the search whenever the implementation state was stable, which causes the working queue to reach the memory limit. Finally, we repeat the benchmarks with failures-divergences refinement, but only for Algorithm 2 as the original algorithm was incorrect. The run time results are presented Table 8 . This shows that deciding failures-divergences refinement has a similar performance to deciding stable failures. The only exception is that the industrial model now fails the refinement check and as such its run time is dependent on the exploration order.
Preprocessing
Refinement checking can be sped up by reducing the state spaces of the two transition systems to be compared. It is known that divergence-respecting weak bisimulation is strong enough to preserve stable failures and failures-divergence refinement [14] . Therefore, the implementation and specification LTSs can be reduced modulo divergence-respecting weak bisimulation. We can also use divergence-preserving branching bisimulation [18] as it is stronger than divergence-respecting weak bisimulation [20] . The known algorithms for divergence-preserving branching bisimulation are far more efficient than the ones for divergence-respecting weak bisimulation. The algorithm that we have used to minimize the LTSs modulo divergence-preserving branching bisimulation is presented in [7] . Its complexity is O(m(log |Act| + log n)), where m is the number of transitions and n the number of states of the labelled transitions system. In Table 9 the number of states and transitions of the benchmarks after reduction are shown. We remark that Example 4.5 will have the same size after reduction using branching bisimulation as it does not contain τ -transitions and as such it has been excluded from these benchmarks. In the following results the reduction time is both included in the run time and presented separately. For most of the benchmarks the implementation and specification LTSs are divergence preserving branching bisimilar so when we reduce both, stable failures refinement can be calculated in negligible time. Therefore, only the specification LTS is reduced when performing these benchmarks. Another advantage of only reducing the specification LTS is that it is easier to reconstruct the trace to the witness when presenting a counter example. Table 10 : Run time comparison between the original algorithm (Algorithm 1) and the corrected algorithm (Algorithm 2) using depth-first (df) and breadth-first (bf) exploration where the specification is reduced modulo divergence-preserving branching bisimulation. Comparing these results with Table 2 shows that by reducing the specification modulo divergencepreserving branching bisimulation can substantially improve the performance of antichain-based algorithms and never harms.
For failures-divergences refinement the results for Algorithm!2) are again similar, which is shown in Table 11 . 
Conclusion
Our study of the antichain-based algorithms for deciding stable failures refinement and failures-divergences refinement presented in [22] revealed that the failures-divergences refinement algorithm is incorrect. Both algorithms perform suboptimally when implemented using a depth-first search strategy and poorly when implemented using a breadth-first search strategy. Furthermore, both violate the claimed antichain property. We propose alternative algorithms for which we have shown correctness and which utilise proper antichains. Our experiments indicate significant performance improvements for deciding stable failures refinement and a performance of deciding failures-divergences refinement that is comparable to deciding stable failures refinement. We also show that preprocessing using divergence-preserving branching bisimulation offers substantial performance benefits. The implementation of our algorithms is available in the open source toolset mCRL2 [4] and is currently used as the backbone in the commercial F-MDE toolset Dezyne; see also [17] .
A Introducing ghost variable Done
The same pseudo code as shown in Algorithm 2 with the ghost variable Done introduced. This variable indicates that a certain state pair was already processed and is used by a number of lemmas in the proof of correctness. let working be a queue containing a pair (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s})
let antichain ← ∅ (init 1 , {s ∈ S 2 | init 2 2 s})
4:
{Done ← ∅}
5:
while working = ∅ do 6: pop (impl , spec) from working 7: if ¬CheckDiv ∨ ¬div(spec) then 8: if CheckDiv ∧ div(impl ) then 9:
return false 10:
if stable(impl ) ∧ refusals(impl ) refusals( Ě spec) then
12:
13:
for impl e − → → 1 impl do 14: if e = τ then 15: spec ← spec spec ← {s ∈ S 2 | ∃s ∈ spec : s e 2 s }
18:
if spec = ∅ then 19: return false 20: if (impl , spec ) antichain then 21: antichain ← antichain (impl , spec )
22:
push (impl , spec ) into working
23:
{Done ← Done ∪ (impl , spec)}
24:
return true
